Dennis J. Richins amd Suesann Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., Inc., and D. Ray Chipman : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
Dennis J. Richins amd Suesann Richins v. Delbert
Chipman & Sons Co., Inc., and D. Ray Chipman :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Backman, Clark & Marsh; Ralph J. Marsh; Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants.
Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn; James R. Brown; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; George A.
Hunt; Attorneys for Appellees.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., Inc., No. 900134 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2517
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
DOCUMENT 
K *• U 
50 
.A "JO 
DOCKET NO. °i UQP*\ - ttf OURT OF APPEALS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 




DELBERT CHIPMAN & SONS CO., 




RICHARD PORTER and 
KENNETH PORTER, 
Defendants-Appellees, 
Case No. 90-0134-CA 
Priority 16 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES 
y^ Appeal from the Order of the 
mirth Judicial District Court of Utah County 
Honorable Boyd L. Park ,\ Judge 
FO! 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
James R. Brown 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
George A. Hunt 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees 
rv 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 




COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 




DELBERT CHIPMAN & SONS CO., 




RICHARD PORTER and 
KENNETH PORTER, 
Defendants-Appellees, 
Case No. 90-0134-CA 
Priority 16 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES 
Appeal from the Order of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County 
Honorable Boyd L. Park, Judge 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
James R. Brown 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
George A. Hunt 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marsh 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Appellants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
STATUTES AND RULES DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
Nature of the Case 2 
Disposition in the Lower Court 3 
Statement of Facts 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
POINT I 5 
POINT II 6 
POINT III 6 
ARGUMENT 7 
POINT I CHIPMAN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE OR TO REFORM 
FALLS UNDER RULE 60(b)(1) AND NOT UNDER 
RULE 60(b)(5), (6), OR (7) 7 
POINT II RULE 60(a) IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS ISSUE. . 19 
POINT III THE COURT DID NOT EXERCISE ANY INHERENT 
POWER AND TO DO SO UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES 




Ackerman v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 71 S. Ct. 
209, 95 L. Ed. 207 (1950) 18 
Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah 1987) . . . . 6, 18 
Bershad v. McDonouah. 469 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir.1972) . . 19 
Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989) . . . 2 
Calder Brothers Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 
1982) 14 
Cruz v. Montova, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983) 16 
Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk. 321 P.2d 221, 7 Utah 2d 
163 (1958) 17 
Herrin v. Herrin, 595 P.2d 1152 (Montana 1979) . . . 6, 18 
Jones v. Acme Building Products, Inc., 450 P.2d 743, 
22 Utah 2d 202 (1969) 17 
Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986) 2 
LPS Hospital v. Capital Life Insurance Co.. (October 
1988, 94 UAR 16) 17 
Laub v. South Central Utah Telephone Association, 
657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982) 
. . . . . 2, 14, 15, 18 
Lindsay v. Atkin. 680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984) . . . 6, 19, 20 
Pitts v. McLachlan. 567 P.2d 171 (Utah 1977) . . . . 14 
Richards v. Siddowav. 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 P.2d 143 
(1970) 19 
Russell v. Martell. 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). . . . 2 
Snvder v. Tompkins. 579 P.2d 994 (Wash. 1978). . . . 1 3 , 14 
RULES 
Utah R.Civ.P. 60(a) 1, 2, 6, 19, 20 
Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b) 2, 6, 7, 14, 18 
ii 
Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 21 
Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) 5, 7, 14, 21 
Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) 5, 7, 14, 21 
Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(7) 5, 7, 14, 21 
MISCELLANEOUS 
46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 202 19 
54 Am.Jur.2d Mistake, Accident, or Surprise § 8 8 
54 Am.Jur.2d Mistake, Accident, or Surprise § 14 . 8 
6A Moore's Federal Practice. Second Edition . . . . 6, 20 
iii 
COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 




DELBERT CHIPMAN & SONS CO., 
INC. and D. RAY CHIPMAN, ] 
individually, 
Defendants-Appellants, ; 
v s . ] 
RICHARD PORTER and ; 
KENNETH PORTER, 
Defendants-Appellees, 
i Case No. 90-0134-CA 
i Priority 16 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in denying 
Defendants' Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., Inc. and D. Ray Chipman 
(hereinafter "Chipman") Motion to Set Aside, or to Refoann the 
Stipulation and Judgment under Rule 60(a) and (b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and the Court's inherent powers? 
STANDARD OF APPET.T.A'TO RRVTTTO 
Chipman has misstated the standard of review by asserting 
the standard to be to "review the lower Court's decision only for 
correctness, without according any deference thereto." The true 
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standard of review is that delineated in Laub v. South Central Utah 
Telephone Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982) at page 1306s 
A motion to modify a final judgment is 
addressed to the discretion of the Trial 
Court, the exercise of which must be based on 
sound legal principles in light of all 
relevant circumstances• The Court's 
determination may be reversed only upon a 
showing that this discretion was abused. 
This is in accord with the later case of Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 
1114 (Utah App. 1989) where this Court declared at page 1117: 
The trial Court is afforded broad discretion 
in ruling on a motion for relief from judgment 
under Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b), and its 
determination will not be disturbed absent an 
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Katz v. 
Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986); Russell v. 
Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1984). 
STATUTES AND RULES DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUE 
Rule 60(a) and (b) is the only Rule of Civil Procedure 
which is determinative of the sole issue of this appeal. Chipman, 
in the Appellant's Brief, has set forth said Rule 60(a) and (b) in 
its entirety and hence Plaintiffs-Appellees, Dennis J. Richins and 
Suesann Richins (hereinafter -Richins-) will not duplicate said 
recitation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Richins filed a Complaint alleging that a sale and lease 
agreement had been entered into between Richins and Chipman. At 
trial on December 21, 1987, Richins presented their evidence and 
rested their case in chief. The parties, during and after the 
lunch break, began to negotiate a settlement. The negotiations 
2 
were conducted between the parties' counsel and Dr. Osguthorpe (a 
confidant of Chipman) and lasted for over one and one-half hours. 
The parties reached an agreed upon stipulation and settlement. The 
stipulation was read into the record and later a written 
Stipulation and Judgment was executed by the attorneys for each of 
the parties and by the Court. 
Fifteen months later, after substantial payments and 
performance by all parties had transpired, Chipman filed a Motion 
to Set Aside or to Reform the Stipulation and Judgment. 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
The lower Court granted Richins' Motion to Dismiss for 
Lack of Jurisdiction on the grounds that Chipman's motions were not 
filed within three months of the date of the judgment as required 
by Rule 60(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or October 4, 
1989. Chipman appealed from the October 4, 1989 order. 
Statement of Facts 
Chipman's Statement of Facts are so twisted by argument, 
accusation, innuendo and distortion that Richins is compelled to 
give an accurate recitation of the facts. 
On or about October 30, 1986, Richins and Chipman entered 
into an agreement wherein Chipman sold to Richins certain grazing 
permits and a 5-year lease with two option periods totalling an 
additional 5-year period (R.2, 7-19, Ex. 9, R.526-529). On April 
27, 1987, Chipman sold and leased part of the same grazing permits 
and ground to Defendants Richard Porter and Kenneth Porter 
(hereinafter "Porter") (R.144-163). 
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The sale agreement to Porter from Chipman contains the 
following specific reference at paragraph 1.4: 
Section 1.4. Porter acknowledges that 
other parties make claim to the fact that one 
or more of the grazing permits being sold 
hereunder have previously been sold to them, 
and that litigation may arise asserting that 
fact. In the event that such litigation 
results in the loss of the grazing permits by 
Porter, Chipman agrees to refund all sums paid 
for the same by Porter. (R.148) 
A Restraining Order was obtained and Porter stipulated to 
remove their sheep from the grazing permits and leased ground by 
June 9, 1987 (R.62-64). 
A Protective Order was entered so that Richins could make 
the payments, under the sale and lease agreement, into Court 
without prejudice to any party (R.133-135). 
Trial was held on December 21, 1987, before the Honorable 
Boyd L. Park (R.197). Richins presented their case in chief and 
the Court recessed at 11:30 a.m. (R.198). The parties' counsel and 
Dr. Osguthorpe, the confidant of Chipman, began negotiations for a 
settlement (R.198, 339-345, 381-388). The parties reached a 
settlement and the stipulation was read into the record (R.504-
515). The Court reconvened at 2:20 p.m. to hear the stipulation 
(R.198). Subsequently, the parties entered into a written 
Stipulation and Judgment on Stipulation (R.202-209, 313-329). 
The Stipulation was explained to Chipman (contrary to the 
assertion by Chipman) and to Dr. Osguthorpe, who advised Chipman to 
settle (R.512-513, 340-342, 381-388). The written Stipulation and 
Judgment conforms with the oral stipulation and was approved by 
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Chipman's counsel after a careful review of the oral stipulation to 
the written Stipulation and Judgment (R.387). Chipman visited the 
offices of his attorney almost daily after the settlement. 
Chipman's counsel prepared a schedule of payments under the 
Stipulation and finally gave Chipman the transcript (or a copy 
thereof) of the Stipulation to keep his memory refreshed of the 
terms (R.387). 
Letters, detailing performance under the Stipulation and 
Judgment, have been sent to Chipman from and after the Judgment 
(R.331-334). Chipman caused to be sent a "Notice of Cancellation" 
dated April 22, 1988, which Notice referenced the terms and 
conditions of the written Stipulation and Judgment and the 
provisions as modified therein (R.335). 
Chipman filed the Motion to Set Aside or to Reform the 
Judgment on March 9, 1989 (R.214). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Chipman's Motion to set aside or to reform properly falls 
under Rule 60(b)(1) and not under Rule 60(b)(5), (6) or (7). 
Chipman asserts that he did not understand the Stipulation, did not 
consent to the Stipulation and/or was not adequately represented by 
counsel. 
The Stipulation was read into the record, concurred in by 
Chipman, Dr. Osguthorpe (Chipman's confidant), and was signed by 
counsel, who reviewed the written Stipulation to be sure it 
conformed with the oral Stipulation. 
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Chipman relied upon the stipulation, sent notices which 
referred to the terms of the stipulation and received benefits in 
excess of $120,000 under the stipulation. 
Chipman waited for 15 months before seeking to set aside 
and/or reform the Judgment. The period of 15 months is too long 
under any provision of Rule 60(b). 
POINT II 
Rule 60(a) is not applicable since Chipman's Motion is 
not "clerical" as opposed to "judicial." See Lindsay v. Atkin, 682 
P.2d 401 (Utah 1984) and Moore's Federal Practice, Second Edition, 
Vol. 6A 9 60.06[1] wherein the authorities make the distinction 
that 60(a) is not available to "correct errors of a serious or 
substantial nature . . . ." 
POINT III 
The Trial Court refused to exercise any "inherent power" 
to set aside or reform the Judgment in light of Rule 60(b)(1) and 
Chipman's failure to make a timely motion. 
Any exercise of the "inherent power" of the Court would 
be an abuse of discretion and constitute the Trial Court rewriting 
a new contract, contrary to the terms of the Stipulation for 
Settlement and Judgment. Chipman's request to set aside and/or 
reform the Judgment is violative of the clear mandate of Herrin v. 
Herrin, 595 P.2d 1152 (Montana 1979), which mandate was approved by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah 
1987), wherein the Court declared that: 
While a Court may intercept contracts . . . a 
Court may not make a new one for the parties 
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and may not alter or amend one which the 
parties themselves have made. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CHIPMAN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE OR TO 
REFORM FALLS UNDER RULE 60(b)(1) AND 
NOT UNDER RULE 60(b) (5) , (6) OR (7). 
The pertinent portions of Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., provide 
as follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
Court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(5) the judgment is void; (6) the 
judgment had been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it 
is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application; 
or (7) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. The motion 
shall be made within a reasonable time and for 
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken. 
Chipman, on appeal, asserts that Chipman's motion falls under 
number 5 or 6 or 7 by declaring: 
Chipman did not enter into any agreement at 
all. Mr. Chipman did not understand what 
Richins was trying to impose upon him and his 
corporation. He did not agree to anything, 
(emphasis supplied, page 9 of Appellant's 
Brief). 
The foregoing language is simply a vivid illustration of a 
"mistake." Mistake is defined, in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th 
Edition).: 
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Some unintentional act, omission, or error 
arising from ignorance, surprise, imposition, 
or misplaced confidence. A mistake exists 
when a person, under some erroneous conviction 
of law or fact, does, or omits to do, some act 
which, but for the erroneous conviction, he 
would not have done or omitted. It may arise 
either from unconsciousness, ignorance, 
forgetfulness, imposition, or misplaced 
confidence. 
Mistake is further defined in 54 Am.Jur.2d § 8 Mistake, page 454: 
"Mistake of law" has been defined as a 
mistaken opinion or inference arising from an 
imperfect or incorrect exercise of the 
judgment upon the facts as they really are. 
Such a mistake has been said to occur where a 
party, having knowledge of the facts, is 
ignorant of the legal consequences of his 
conduct or reaches an erroneous conclusion as 
to the effect thereof. 
SxrprLse is defined in 54 Am.Jur.2d § 14, Mistake, page 458: 
A man is surprised in whatever is not done 
with so much judgment as it ought to be. 
Chipman takes the position that he did not understand the 
stipulation, did not consent to it, was not adequately represented 
by counsel when the stipulation was reached, and that the 
stipulation is ambiguous, unfair or inconsistent with the intent of 
the parties. Distilled to its essence, Chipman's motion is based 
upon mistake, inadvertence (another definition of mistake), 
surprise or excusable neglect, the items listed in Rule 60(b)(1) 
and subject to the three month limitation. 
When asked, in open Court, if he understood the 
stipulation, Mr. Chipman stated: 
MR. WOOTTON: Mr. Chipman you have been in 
Court and listened to that stipulation have 
you not sir? 
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MR. CHIPMAN: What Stipulation. 
MR. WOOTTON: The one Mr. Brown just stated into the 
record? 
MR. CHIPMAN: Well I don't understand it. 
MR. WOOTTON: Well have you been in here and 
you understand it? 
MR. CHIPMAN: I have been in here a long time 
and I don't quite understand it but I guess it 
is all right. 
MR. WOOTTON: All right Mr. Osterthorpe you 
are Mr. Chipman's friend? 
MR. OSTERTHORPE: Yes. 
MR. WOOTTON: You have been in the Courtroom 
and heard it too? 
MR. OSTERTHORPE: Yes. 
MR. WOOTTON: And do you think it is reasonable? 
MR. OSTERTHORPE: Yes. 
(emphasis supplied, R.512-513). 
Now, Chipman states in an Affidavit he did not understand or agree 
to the Stipulation. Although it appears that Chipman has merely 
changed his mind about the Stipulation and is urging the Court to 
sanction his whims, it should be kept in mind that Mr. Wootton, 
Chipman's attorney of record, did, in fact, agree to and Mr. 
Wootton did sign the Stipulation on behalf of Mr. Chipman. 
Judgment was then entered upon the Stipulation. 
The changing of Chipman's mind is aptly displayed by 
Chipman's Notice of Cancellation, dated April 29, 1988 (R.335), 
which provides in pertinent part: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to the 
provisions of the Stipulation and Settlement 
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Agreement entered into on December 21, 1987, 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court, a lease 
payment was due in the maximum amount of 
$15,700.00 and a minimum amount of $4,180.00 
depending on the status of the Pine Hollow 
Grazing Permit, and no such payments have been 
received. 
Under the provisions of the agreement 
entered into as described above, you are 
notified that the undersigned lessors exercise 
their option to cancel the lease referred to 
in the stipulation thirty (30) days from the 
date of this notice unless the payment of 
$15,700.00 is received within that time if the 
Pine Hollow Permit is still in effect, or the 
payment of $4,180.00 if the Pine Hollow Permit 
is cancelled and evidence of that cancellation 
is provided (emphasis supplied). 
Mr. Wootton, under oath, declared at pages 382-388: 
6. On the 21st dat (sic) of December 
1987, Chipman, Porters, Richins and their 
respective counsel entered into discussions 
about possible settlement. These discussions 
lasted for at least one and one-half hours or 
more. 
7. Chipman had a confidant, Doctor 
Osguthorpe, and the discussions, proposals and 
counter proposals were all discussed with 
Chipman and Osguthorpe. 
8. Osguthorpe was there at the request 
of Chipman and affiant to be a witness on 
Chipman's behalf. At some point in time 
during the discussions leading up to the 
Judgment, there remained only two issues not 
acceptable to Chipman. Tose (sic) issues 
were: 
a) A ten year term for the lease; 
b) Allowing up to 100 head of cattle to 
be on the ground. 
9. Dr. Osguthorpe, in the presence of 
affiant, advised Chipman to accept the 10 year 
term and to allow up to 100 head of cattle, 
which cattle grazing had been historically 
done under Chipman's management. 
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10. Affiant, with Dr. Osguthorpe and 
Chipman, discussed and explained at length and 
in detail: 
a) The forgiveness of $21,000 
payment by way of part of the damages due 
Richins; 
b) the reduction of the semi-
annual installment to $19,700; 
c) the lease would be for a 10-
year period; 
d) Richins could run up to 100 
head of cattle; 
e) there would be payments made to 
Porter instead of Chipman for the 
purchase price of the two permits; 
f) Porters would be awarded 
judgment of $20,000 with no execution on 
the Judgment as long as Richins paid 
$4,000 per semi-annual payment directly 
to Porters; 
g) Richins would be awarded 
additional damages to be withheld at the 
rate of $2,500 per semi-annual lease 
payment; 
h) That Exhibit "A" to the 
complaint would be rewritten to reflect 
the changes agreed to and attached to the 
Stipulation for Settlement and Judgment; 
i) Porters, upon receipt of 
$30,000 of the $54,000 which had been 
paid into the Court, would convey and 
assign over to Richins both of the 
permits which Chipman sold to Porters; 
j) $15,700 was to be paid to 
Chipman; 
k) $4,300 would be paid as a pre-
payment to Porters on the remaining 
balance for the two permits; 
1) there was the possibility that 
the Pine Hollow permit would be cancelled 
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(sic) by the Forest Department. If the 
Pine Hollow permit was not cancelled 
(sic), Richins would pay Chipman for the 
Pine Hollow last; 
m) if Pine Hollow was cancelled 
(sic), there would be an offset of 
$11,520 (anually), which would be 
deducted for the grazing year (Fall 1987 
and Spring of 1988) from the April 1988 
payment; 
n) if the Pine Hollow permit was 
only partially cancelled (sic), there 
would be a pro-rata reduction on the 
basis of $9.60 per head; 
o) Chipman was given until 
December 15, 1989 to protest, appeal or 
take whatever other steps he desired to 
make available to Richins the Pine Hollow 
permit, and he was so advised by Affiant. 
He did not do so. 
p) Richins may pay direct the 
lease payments to BLM, State Land, U.S. 
Forest and/or private third party lessors 
and deduct said payments from the $19,700 
semi-annual payments; 
q) in the event that the U.S. 
Forest Department cancelled (sic) the 
entire Pine Hollow permit, there would be 
a further reduction of the semi-annual 
lease payment of $5,760 for the remianing 
(sic) period; 
r) there would be a written 
Stipulation for Settlement to be prepared 
by Mr. Brown; 
s) Chipman could terminate the 
lease if Richins did not pay the lease 
payment timely, but after a 30-day notice 
in writing was sent to Richins. 
11. At the conclusion of going over the 
elements in paragraph 10 above with Dr. 
Osguthorpe, Dr. Osguthorpe advised Chipman to 
take the proposed offer of settlement. 
Chipman then told affiant "settle." 
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12• Affiant was authorized "to settle" 
the case upon the terms of paragraph 10. 
16. After the hearing was concluded, 
affiant ordered a copy of the transcript from 
the Court Reporter, Mr. Tatton. The purpose 
of this transcript was to verify the formal 
written Stipulation and Judgment conformed 
with the oral stipulation and affiant's 
understanding of the Stipulation and the terms 
discussed at length with Chipman and Dr. 
Osguthorpe. 
17. Chipman visited affiant at his 
office almost daily following the settlement 
and affiant on those occasions discussed at 
length the terms and conditions of the 
Stipulation and showed to Chipman the 
transcript. At one point in time affiant gave 
the transcript to Chipman to keep and to 
refresh his memory about the terms. Affiant 
was asked by Chipman to prepare a schedule of 
payments Chipman would receive which affiant 
did. 
18. Affiant compared the written 
Stipulation for Settlement and Judgment with 
the transcript and found the Judgment to 
conform to the transcript of the oral 
stipulation. 
19. Affiant prepared, at the request of 
Chipman, the Notice of Cancellation dated 
April 29, 1988, and had a lengthy discussion 
with Chipman on that occasion and again 
reviewed the terms of the Judgment and 
Stipulation. 
The record is CONSPICUOUS BY THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION THAT MR. 
WOOTTON WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO SETTLE. The law is aptly stated in 
Snyder v. Tompkins, 579 P.2d 994 (Wash. 1978): 
The law favors the amicable settlement of 
disputes, and is inclined to view them with 
finality. An agreement arrived at in this 
matter is binding on the parties and will not 
be reviewed on appeal unless the party 
contesting it can show that the stipulation 
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was a product of fraud or that the attorney 
over-reached his authority . . . . fOlnce a 
client has designated an attorney to represent 
him, the Court and other parties to the action 
are entitled to rely upon that authority until 
the relationship is terminated. 
We subscribe to the principle that a person 
attempting to dislocate an in-Court settlement 
of a claim has the burden of showing that the 
agreement was a product of fraud or over-
reaching. 
Furthermore, a trial Court's determination 
that the parties fully appreciated the terms 
of the settlement will not be disturbed where 
it is supported by the evidence. Here, the 
record supports the Court's finding that Ms. 
Tompkins was fully apprised of the settlement 
terms immediately before her attorney 
presented them in open Court. Nevertheless, 
she voluntarily absented herself from the 
Courtroom during the oral stipulation, 
indicating that she acquiesced in the 
settlement. 
Id. at 998, 999 (citations omitted; emphasis added). 
The reasons set forth in the Motion of Chipman are all 
reasons set forth under paragraph 1 of Rule 60(b). Chipman has 
attempted to bootstrap themselves into a posture of paragraphs (5), 
(6) or (7) because of the expiration of the time element that is 
required under Rule 60(b)(1) . However, Utah law is very clear that 
one cannot utilize subdivision 60(b)(5), (6) or (7) to circumvent 
the 3 month filing period if the bases for the relief from the 
Judgment is based upon mistake or inadvertence or excusable 
neglect. See Pitts v. McLachlan, 567 P.2d 171 (Utah 1977), Calder 
Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982) and Laub v. South 
Central Utah Telephone Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982). 
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It is absolutely jurisdictional to present the reasons 
that are presented in this Motion by Chipman within three months. 
If the Motion is not filed within three months, it is untimely and 
this Court does not have jurisdiction to allow even a hearing. In 
Laub, supra, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the Judgment was 
in error by the following language found at page 1308: 
In view of the fact that Plaintiff's judgment 
should never have included the previous 
compensated damages, defendant South Central's 
own mistake or neglect is the cause of 
plaintiff's partial double recovery. As 
discussed above, South Central could have 
prevented this undesirable result by timely 
motion to strike the improper portion of the 
prayer for relief or to amend the judgment. 
This failure to act seasonably falls more 
accurately under subdivision (1) of Rule 60(b) 
allowing relief from a judgment rendered by 
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect." 
Chipman argues that he had ineffective counsel because 
his trial counsel was purportedly under the influence of alcohol. 
The basis for the assertion of trial counsel being under the 
influence of alcohol would have been known on December 21, 1987, 
i.e., the allegations set forth in Chipman's Affidavit (R.220-221) 
and Dr. Osguthorpe's affidavit (R.226). First, Chipman has not 
denied to date that trial counsel had authority to settle. Second, 
the trial counsel affirmatively asserts he had authority to settle. 
Third, the Stipulation and Judgment, signed by counsel for Chipman, 
was executed after comparing the same to the transcript of the oral 
stipulation. Fourth, the terms and provisions of the transcript 
and the written Stipulation and Judgment were reviewed with Chipman 
on numerous occasions before March 1988. Fifth, the "cancellation 
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provisions" are found in paragraph 3.1 of the Exhibit "A" to the 
Stipulation for Settlement and Judgment (R.313-329), THE VERY 
DOCUMENT CHIPMAN SAYS HE NEVER SAW. However, the April 29, 1988, 
Notice of Cancellation prepared by trial counsel for Chipman refers 
to this provision (R.335). There is no objective showing that 
Chipman had ineffective counsel. 
Effective counsel is not a constitutional right in a 
civil action. Assuming, arguendo, that counsel was ineffective, 
that simply puts the ineffective counsel as "excusable neglect." 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 
723 (Utah 1983) at page 728, declared as follows: 
Val complains that his trial counsel argued in 
support of Mike's motion for a directed 
verdict, and that his counsel failed to make a 
motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Val argues 
that this act and omission require that he be 
granted a new trial. He cites no authority 
for this proposition, and with good reason. A 
civil action is not reversed because privately 
retained counsel was incompetent. If trial 
counsel was indeed incompetent, then Val may 
be entitled to seek redress against him in a 
separate action. 
Chipmanfs assertion that the Stipulation is ambiguous, 
inconsistent, unclear, confusing and incomplete to show the lack of 
meeting of the minds is without merit. 
The allegation that the terms of the Stipulation are so 
ambiguous, inconsistent, unclear and confusing again points to the 
very issue that it would be a mistake to enter into such a 
Stipulation. Mistake must be brought within three months. Utah 
law is very clear about written contracts in which the Stipulation, 
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by its terms, became. As stated in Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 
321 P.2d 221, 7 Utah 2d 163 (1958) at page 166, states: 
. . . the fundamental concepts in regard to 
contracts: that their purpose is to reduce to 
writing the conditions upon which the minds of 
the parties have met and to fix their rights 
and duties in respect thereto. The intent so 
expressed is to be found, if possible, within 
the four corners of the instrument itself in 
accordance with the ordinary accepted meaning 
of the words used . . . . Generally speaking, 
neither of the parties, nor the Court has any 
right to ignore or modify conditions which are 
clearly expressed merely because it may 
subject one of the parties to hardship, but 
they must be enforced "in accordance with the 
intention as manifested by the language used 
by the parties to the contract. 
That statement was again affirmed by the Court in Jones v. Acme 
Building Products, Inc., 450 P.2d 743, 22 Utah 2d 202 (1969), at 
page 206. 
The Court is not able to rewrite the agreement of the 
parties. Our Supreme Court, in a very recent case, LPS Hospital v. 
Capital Life Insurance Co., 765 P.2d 857 (Utah 1988), declared at 
page 858: 
A cardinal rule in construing the contract is 
to give effect to the intentions of the 
parties and, if possible, these intentions 
should be gleaned from an examination of the 
text of the contract itself. 
The contract itself is the written Stipulation, which is signed by 
all parties. There is no allegation nor any assertion by Chipman 
that Mr. Wootton was not authorized to settle. 
Our Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals has 
consistently held that a Court cannot rewrite a contract. The 
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It is not necessary, however, that the 
contract itself contain all of the particulars 
of the agreement. The crucial factor is that 
the parties agreed on the essential elements 
of the contract. 
In the same opinion, the Court of Appeals cited with approval the 
language from the Montana case of Herrin v. Herrin, 595 P.2d 1152, 
1155 (Montana 1979): 
While a Court may interpret contracts which 
are open to interpretation, a Court may not 
make a new one for the parties and may not 
alter or amend one which the parties 
themselves have made. 
Chipman asserts the Stipulation for Settlement and 
Judgment are so unfair and inequitable as to be unconscionable. 
This assertion is based upon a mistake of entering into an 
unconscionable or inequitable contract. The Utah Supreme Court in 
Laub, supra, cited with approval the case of Ackerman v. United 
States, 340 U.S. 193, 198, 71 S. Ct. 209, 211, 95 L. Ed. 207 
(1950), wherein the United States Supreme Court denied relief under 
Rule 60(b) by stating: 
Deliberate choices are not to be relieved 
from. 
Chipman made deliberate choices by agreeing to the Stipulation for 
Settlement and Judgment. Chipman acted upon that choice, received 
the benefits (payments either directly or for his benefit of over 
$120,000), and sought to enforce the very terms of the Stipulation. 
He cannot be relieved from such a deliberate choice. 
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POINT II 
RULE 60(d) IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS 
ISSUE. 
Rule 60(a), U.R.C.P., provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or 
other parts of the record and errors therein 
arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the Court at any time of its own 
initiative or on the motion of any party and 
after such notice, if any, as the Court orders 
. . . . 
Rule 60(a) cannot be used as a vehicle to circumvent the time 
constraints of 60(b). The case of Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401 
(Utah 1984), is directly on point in the discussion of the breadth 
of 60(a), when at page 402 the Court declared: 
This Court has differentiated between clerical 
errors and judicial errors, stating: 
The distinction between a judicial error 
and a clerical error does not depend upon 
who made it. Rather, it depends on 
whether it was made in rendering the 
judgment or in recording the judgment as 
rendered. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 202. 
Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 317, 471 
P.2d 143, 145 (1970) (emphasis added). The 
correction contemplated by Rule 60(a) must be 
undertaken for the purpose of reflecting the 
actual intention of the Court and parties. 6A 
Moore's Federal Practice 1J 60.06[1] (2d ed. 
1983). Rule 60(a) is not intended to correct 
errors of a substantial nature, particularly 
where the claim of error is unilateral. The 
fact that an intention was subsequently found 
to be mistaken would not cause the mistake to 
be "clerical." See Bershad v. McDonough, 469 
F.2d 1333 (7th Cir.1972). 
The unilateral mistake of Chipman is not "clerical." 
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The Court in Lindsay, supra, cited with approval Moore's 
Federal Practice. A further look at that authority reveals: 
The errors envisioned by Rule 60(a) cover 
such things as misprisions, oversights and 
omissions, unintended acts or failures to act. 
In the interest of justice, and to the end 
that the record reflect the actual intention 
of the Court and parties, relief from such 
minor errors should be freely granted. But it 
is clear that errors of a serious or 
substantial nature are not included, and thus 
Rule 60(a) does not properly apply to action 
or non-action that properly reflects the 
intention of the parties or the Court. 
Moored Federal Practice, Second Edition Vol 6A, 1f 60.06[1], 11 60-
41 and 1F 60-42. The distinction is "clerical" versus "intention" 
or "judicial." The unilateral changing of Chipman's mind, or 
Chipman's mistake as to their intent, is not an error that falls 
under the ambit of Rule 60(a). 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT EXERCISE ANY 
INHERENT POWER AND TO DO SO UNDER 
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
No one argues that the Court certainly has equitable 
jurisdiction to modify its own judgments or orders. However, the 
factual circumstances in this case are so compelling that the Court 
cannot and should not set aside the Stipulated Judgment simply 
because Chipman changes their minds. 
Our Courts have universally recognized the need of 
finality to judgments. The bases for challenging judgments are 
restricted as well as the time frames within which to file such a 
challenge. The Trial Court properly, and within its sound 
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discretion, ruled that it had no jurisdiction to set aside or 
reform the agreed upon and Stipulated judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Chipman's Motion is untimely and was properly denied and 
stricken since the basis of the Motion was properly under Rule 
60(b)(1) and not under Rule 60(b)(5), (6) or (7). 
Richins is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under 
the provisions of the Stipulation for Settlement and Judgment. 
Chipman's appeal should be dismissed and the matter remanded to the 
Trial Court for determination of reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs to be awarded Richins under the agreement. 
DATED this // day of September, ^9T97K 
& DUNN 
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Rule 50, Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A party who moves 
for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may 
offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having 
reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not 
been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a 
waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for 
directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific 
ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed 
verdict is effective without any assent of the jury. 
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict Whenever a mo-
tion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for 
any reason ih not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to 
the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the 
motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has 
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment 
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his 
motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party, 
within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in 
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial 
may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the 
alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to 
stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the 
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict 
was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested 
verdict had been directed or may order a new trial. 
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant of motion. 
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided 
for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on 
the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be 
granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall spec-
ify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the 
motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon 
does not affect the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new 
trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on 
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has other-
wise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally 
denied, the respondent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if 
the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in 
accordance with the order of the appellate court. 
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant 
to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. 
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respon-
dent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate 
court concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, 
nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is 
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether a 
new trial shall be granted. 
Rule 59, New trials; amendments of judgment, 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
F&Ees<$?l!CTCMI?lT 
Third .judicial District 
JUL \ 9 1939 
0 SALT WKB COUNTY 
By Lit 4 ^ Otputy Ctork 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 







Civil No- 860909577PI 
Judge Frank G* Noel 
We, the jury, based upon a preponderance of the 
evidence find on the Special Verdict submitted to us as follows: 
1. At the time and place in question and under the 
conditions as shown by the evidence, was the defendant, Otis 
Elevator, negligent? 
Yes No 
If your answer is Yes, go on to Question No. 2. If your answer 
is No, go to Question No. 3. 
Vlas such negligence a proximate cause of injury to 
the plaintiff? 
Yes No 
Go on to Question No. 3. 
* 
j ~ ; 
r\ 
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3. Did the functioning of the Otis elevator in 
question on April 9, 1986 breach the defendant's implied warranty 
of merchantability? 
IQS" Yes l^y No 
If your answer to xsv Yesf go on to Question No. 4. If your 
answer is No, go on to Question No. 5. 
4. Was the defendant's breach of that implied 
warranty of merchantability a proximate cause of injury to the 
plaintiff? 
Yes \yr NO 
Go on to Question No. 5. 
5. Did the functioning of the Otis elevator in 
question on April 9, 1986 breach the defendant's implied warranty 
of fitness for particular purpose? 
Yes i ^ ^ No 
If your answer is Yes, go on to Question No. 6. If your answer 
is Nof go on to Question No. 7. 
6. Was the defendant's breach of that implied 
warranty of fitness for particular purpose a proximate cause of 
injury to the plaintiff? 
Yes__J/_ No 
Go on to Question No. 7. 
4\ 
7 . Was t h e e l e v a t o r i n q u e s t i o n i n a d e f e c t i v e 
cotvdLt-iotv vu\x e ^sQaably d a n q e r o u s t o t h e u s e r ? 
Ye* [s^ No 
If your answer is Yes, go on Question No. 8. If your answer is 
No, go on to Question No, 9. 
8. Was that defective condition of the elevator in 
question a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff? 
Ye3 \ y ^ No 
Go on to Question No- 9. 
9. If you answered Yes to Questions 1 and 2 or Yes to 
Questions Nog• 3 and 4 or Yes to Questions Nos. 5 and 6 or Yes to 
Questions Nog• 7 and 8, please answer Question No. 10. If not, 
return this special Verdict to the bailiff now. 
10. What amount would fairly and adequately compensate 
the plaintiff for the injuries he sustained as a result of the 
accident in question? 
Special Damages $ / 7 f £f}£ , td 
General Damages $ ^^^f00m ^$7 £ £ ^  
TOTAL $ /V, ^ ' ' S ^ 7*^' 
DA'fED this /Q day of July, 1989. n £ "9 Z:£ <''~Z \ 
\j4:H7H\i,,',-X<kL) 
FOREPERSON 
GORDON K. JENSEN - A4 351 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
t 3 I 
Third Jud.aaJ Ojstwct 
AUG 1 7 1989 
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Civil No. 860909577PI 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
This matter was tried to a jury on July 17, 18 and 19, 
1989, the Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding. Gordon K. Jensen of 
Robert J, DeBry and Associates represented the plaintiff. Bruce 
R. Garner of Richards, Brandt, Miller and Nelson represented the 
defendant. The liability of the defendant was submitted to the 
jury on four theories: Negligence; breach of implied warranty of 
merchantability; breach of implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose; and strict products liability. 
The jury returned a verdict finding that the defendant 
was not negligent, but that the defendant had breached its 
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a 
particular purpose and that the elevator in question was in a 
**'\* 
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the ultimate user 
or consumer and, therefore, liable to the plaintiff under strict 
products liability. 
The jury further found that these breaches of implied 
warranty and the defective condition of the elevator were the 
proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff. 
Based on those findings of liability and causation 
against the defendant, the jury returned the following verdict on 
damages: 
What amount would fairly and adequately 
compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he 
sustained as a result of the accident in 
question? 
Special Damages $17,250.00 
General Damages 5,000 .00 
TOTAL $22,250.00 
The verdict was appropriately dated and signed by the 
foreperson. Based upon the Special Verdict of the jury; 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment be 
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as 
follows: 
1. The plaintiff is awarded judgment against the 
defendant for special damages in the amount of $17,250. 
2 .-'O^ ' 
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2. The plaintiff is awarded $4,521.78 as pre-
judgment interest on special damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-44. This represents interest at 8% per annum on $17,250 
from April 9, 1986 to July 19, 1989-
3. The plaintiff is awarded judgment against the 
defendants for general damages in the amount of $5,000. 
4. The plaintiff is awarded post-judgment interest 
against the defendant pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §15-1-4, 
consistent with this judgment, accruing at the rate of 12% per 
annum. 
5. The plaintiff is awarded his costs of court in the 
amount of $543.95. 
DATED thi .ji day of 
FRANK G. NOEL 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
BRUCE R. GARNER 
Attorney for the Defendant 
IV r -
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EISENSTAEDT, ROBERT 
VS 





CASE NUMBER 860909577 PI 
DATE 09/28/89 
HONORABLE FRANK G NOEL 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK NP 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. JENSEN, GORDON K. 
D. ATTY. BURTON, ROBERT A. 
THE COURT HAS REVIEWED DEFTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR 
A REMITTITUR TOGETHER WITH THE MEMOS FILED IN CONNECTION THERE-
WITH AND NOW RULES AS FOLLOWS: IT IS NOT FOR THE COURT TO WEIGH 
THE EVIDENCE NOR TO SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE JURY 
ON FACTUAL ISSUES. THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION THAT THERE WAS 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON BOTH THE LIABILITY AND DAMAGE ISSUES UPON 
WHICH THE JURY COULD BASE ITS VERDICT. FOR THAT REASON AND FOR 
THE REASONS STATED IN PLTFS MEMO THE COURT DENIES DEFTS MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A REMITTITUR. COUNSEL FOR PLTF IS TO 
PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT WITH THIS RULING AND SUBMIT IT TO 
THE COURT FOR SIGNATURE. 
iv:^ 
.*ofc 
GORDON K. JENSEN - A4351 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




SEARS ROEBUCK CO. and ) 
OTIS ELEVATOR, ] 
Defendants. 
i ORDER 
| Civil No. C860909577 PI 
I Judge Frank G. Noel 
The defendant Otis Elevator's Motion for a New Trial 
or, in the Alternative, For Remittitur and its Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the Alternative, 
New Trial came before the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Based on the memoranda 
of the parties, pursuant to the Court's Minute Entry of 
September 28, 1989, and good cause appearing: 
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant Otis Elevator's 
Motion for New Trial or, in the Alternative, For Remittitur and 
its Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the 
Alternative, New Trial are denied. 
OCT 2 3 1989 
N S ^ L T LAKC COUNTY 
DATED th is />Qday of O <^ >A y , 19^ 8-. 
Approved as to Form: 
BROCE R. GARMEI 
Attorney for JOtis Elevator 
HONORABLE FRANK G. NO 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on the ~&$ day of October/ 1989, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER (Eisenstaedt v. 
Sears, et al) was mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing a copy 
of the same in the U.S. mail, to the following: 
Bruce R. Garner 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorney for Defendant Otis Elevator Company 
Key Bank Tower, 7th Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P. O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
2185-013 
f\*»/>* w , '„ 
